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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants have appealed a final order of the district court. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)0), 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In their docketing statement, Appellants' contend that there are eighteen separate 
appealable issues in this case. [Docketing Statement, at 10-15.] In their opening brief, Appellants' 
have reduced those claims to seven. [Opening Brief of Appellants, at 1-3 ("App. Br.").] A review 
of the record, however, reveals that there are only two issues on appeal: 
Issue Number 1: Did the trial court properly dismiss plaintiffs' claims on the basis that 
the Trustees of the Association are not liable for the contracts of the Association because the 
plaintiffs did not allege that the Trustees breached the applicable standard of care in discharging 
their duties as Trustees? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a 
question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. Tiede v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 915 
P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996). 
Preservation of the Issue: [R. 289-90, 294-96; 462.] 
Issue Number 2: Does the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Co-Operative Association Act 
(the "Nonprofit Corporation Act") provide the appropriate standard of care for trustees of a 
homeowners association incorporated under the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act? 
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Standard of Review: Interpretation of a statute is a question of law which the reviewing 
court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Stephens 
v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 1997 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation of the Issue: [R. 289; 462-64] 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107(1). 
A trustee or officer of a nonprofit corporation is not personally liable to the 
corporation or its members for civil claims arising from acts or omissions 
made in the performance of his duties as a trustee or officer, unless the acts 
or omissions are the result of his intentional misconduct. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-35(1). 
The provisions of [the Utah Condominium Act] shall be in addition and 
supplemental to all other provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared, 
provided that wherever the application of the provisions of this act conflict 
with the application of such other provisions, this act shall prevai l . . . . 
STAi EMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
In this case, Appellants, owners of condominiums in the American Towers Condominium 
Project, have sued their neighbors in their capacities as past and present voluntary members of the 
Board of Trustees ("Trustees") of the American Towers Association (the "Association"), a Utah 
nonprofit corporation. Appellants challenge the Trustees' decision to pursue and fund litigation 
against the builders and developers of the project on behalf of the Association and for the benefit 
of the Association. Although Appellants seek in this litigation to obtain personal judgment against 
these current and former Trustees, Appellants have not alleged that these individuals profited in 
any way from their management of this nonprofit organization. The Trustees are alleged to have 
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acted negligently, with gross negligence and contrary to the Association's Declaration and Bylaws. 
They are not alleged to have engaged in intentional misconduct. 
The Trustees are alleged to have approved litigation against CCI Mechanical, Inc. ("CO 
Mechanical") to recover millions of dollars from them to repair the substantial defects in the 
building's mechanical system. These defects effect the entire project. To fund this litigation, the 
Trustees are alleged to have used the Association's reserve account, the account into which the 
proceeds derived from the litigation would be deposited. The Trustees are alleged to have used 
reserves on the advice of the Association's outside accountants and lawyers. 
The Trustees moved to dismiss Appellants' Complaint on the basis that under Utah law, 
trustees of a nonprofit organization are not liable except in circumstances where they engage in 
"intentional misconduct." Which means that such volunteers are liable only if they intentionally 
do something they know to be wrong. Because the Appellants have never alleged that these 
Trustees engaged in intentional misconduct, the district court dismissed the Appellees' Complaint 
but granted Appellees' Leave to Amend to add a claim of intentional misconduct. Appellees 
elected not to amend but instead chose to pursue this appeal. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On June 10, 1996, Defendants/Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Verified 
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted. A hearing was held 
on Defendants/Appellees' motion on August 9, 1996, before the Honorable David S. Young. 
After hearing arguments of counsel, Judge Young ruled that Defendants/Appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss would be granted. [R. 497, 374.] On August 21, 1997, the Order Granting Motion to 
Dismiss was entered. The Order provides that the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint was dismissed, 
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with prejudice, with leave to amend to assert only claims of intentional misconduct. [R. 375-76.] 
The Court specifically found that "the only applicable standard of care for directors or trustees of a 
Utah nonprofit condominium association is intentional misconduct." [R. 376.] Appellants elected 
not to amend their complaint. The instant appeal followed. 
3. Statement of Facts. 
The operative documents in this case—the American Towers Declaration and Bylaws—are 
before the Court and any gloss which the parties may add is superfluous and improper. 
Appellants' Statement of Facts, however, contains just such a gloss on various provisions of the 
operative documents as well as numerous inappropriate legal conclusions which are not "facts." 
Accordingly, Appellees submit the following Statement of Facts: 
1. American Towers is a condominium project located at 44 West Broadway, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, which contains both commercial and residential units. [R. at 61-63, 197.] 
2. The Association is a Utah "nonprofit" corporation. [R. at 101, 197.] 
3. The Board of Trustees (the "Board") of the Association manages the property, 
affairs, and business of the Association. [R. at 101, 197.] 
4. Appellants are members of the Association and owners of condominium units at 
American Towers. [R. at 196.] 
5. Appellees John Zinn, Sandra Ridges, Glen Getz, Bill Melville, William S. 
Richards, Judith Anderson Giesa, Joan Holmes, William T. Matlock, Don Clark, Sterling Rigby, 
Wayne Lantz, Von Callister, Brian Jeppson, Kim Hibbert, Glen McKay, Mike Jones, Johnny 
Bowne, Victor Romero, Craig Thorley, Norman J. Salisbury, and Spencer Kimball are alleged to 
be past and present directors and members of the Board. [R. at 197.] 
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6. Construction on American Towers began in 1981. [R. at 198.] 
7. CCI Mechanical was the mechanical subcontractor that designed and constructed 
the mechanical,,plumbing, fire protection, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems. [R. 
at 198.] 
8. In 1991, the Association filed a complaint against CCI Mechanical and other 
defendants for faulty construction (the "CCI Litigation"). [R. at 199.] 
9. In Declaration Article XIX titled "Mortgagee Protection," the Association is to 
provide for establishment of an adequate reserve: 
Section 19.05. Revenue Fund And Working Capital Fund Required. The 
Association shall establish an adequate reserve to cover the cost of reasonably 
predictable and necessary repairs and replacements of the Common Areas and any 
component thereof and shall cause such reserve to be funded by regular monthly or 
other periodic assessments against the Condominiums rather than by Special 
Assessments. 
[Decl. § 19.05 (R. at 84).] 
10. No other provision of the Declaration or Bylaws mentions or refers to a reserve 
fund or directs how or under what procedures the Association's reserves are to be used. [See R. at 
47-110.] 
11. Pursuant to Declaration Article 10.03 the Association has the following power: 
The Association may obtain and pay for the services of such personnel as the 
Association shall determine to be necessary or desirable for the proper operation of 
the Project, whether such personnel are furnished or employed directly by the 
Association or by any person with whom it contracts. The Association may obtain 
and pay for legal and accounting services necessary or desirable in connection with 
the operation of the Project or the enforcement of this Declaration. In addition to 
the foregoing, the Association may acquire and pay for out of the Common Expense 
Fund water, sewer, garbage collection, electrical, gas, and other necessary or 
desirable utility services for the Common Areas (and for the Units to the extent not 
separately metered or billed), insurance, bonds, and other goods and services 
common to the Units; provided, however, that any such item which is separately 
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metered or billed and which relates exclusively to the Residential Limited Common 
Areas or the Commercial Limited Common Areas shall be paid for, respectively, 
out of the Special Residential Fund or the Special Commercial Fund. (Emphasis 
added.) 
[Decl. at § 10.03 (R. at 66-67, 202).] 
12. Declaration Article 10.08 also grants the Association all necessary implied powers: 
10.08 Implied Rights. The Association may exercise any right, power, or privilege 
given to it expressly by this Declaration or by law, and every other right or privilege 
reasonably implied from the existence of any right or privilege given to it herein or 
reasonably necessary to effectuate any such right or privilege. 
[Decl. at § 10.08 (R. at 68).] 
13. Allegedly on the advice of a lawyer and an accountant, the Board used funds from 
the Association's reserves to finance the CCI Litigation. [R. at 212.] 
14. By an Order dated September 19, 1994, Judge Dennis Frederick granted summary 
judgment against the Association in the CCI Litigation, in part, based upon statutes of limitations. 
[R. at 199.] 
15. The Association appealed that decision to the Utah Supreme Court. [R. at 200.] 
16. On December 20, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary 
judgment. American Towers Owners Ass'n. v. CCI Mech.. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). 
17. Appellants allege that the Trustees misappropriated approximately $750,000 from 
the reserves to finance the CCI Litigation. [R. at 200.] 
18. Appellants asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and corporate 
mismanagement and waste of assets but have not alleged any intentional misconduct by the 
Trustees. [R. at 217-32.] 
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19. Appellants assert that the Declaration, entered into by American Towers, Inc. and 
Block 58 Associates, the Association's Articles of Incorporation ("Articles"), and Bylaws form a 
contract between and among the Association, the owners and the Board. [R. at 219.] 
20. Appellants allege that the Board has a contractual duty to comply "strictly" with the 
Articles, Bylaws, and Declaration. The contractual source of this duty is alleged to be Declaration 
Article XVII § 18.01, which provides: "Each Owner shall comply strictly with the provisions of 
this Declaration, the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association . . . ." [R. at 218-19.] 
21. Appellants seek an accounting of the source and monies used to finance the CCI 
Litigation and the dates and minutes of the Board's meetings at which the Board voted to use 
money from the Common Expense Fund or the Reserve Fund to finance the CCI Litigation. [R. at 
234-35.] 
22. Appellants state their right under Utah law to inspect the books and records of the 
Association, but do not allege that this right has ever previously been asserted or denied. [R. at 
235.] 
23. Appellants allege that the law imposes a constructive trust on the defendants 
because of their alleged breach of fiduciary duty. [R. at 234-35.] 
24. On May 29, 1996, Defendants/Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted. [R. at 278.] 
25. On August 9, 1996, after a hearing on Defendants/Appellees Motion to Dismiss, the 
district court granted Defendants/Appellees' Motion. [R. at 374-76.] 
26. On September 11, 1996, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal. [R. at 380.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, volunteer directors of nonprofit corporations such as the Association incur 
liability to the corporation only if they engage in intentional misconduct. Utah law further 
provides that nonprofit corporations can "sue and be sued." In this case, the volunteer directors of 
the American Towers Association, acting on behalf of the Association, pursued litigation against a 
contractor who had performed faulty work on the American Towers Project. Six of the over 300 
American Towers owners, purportedly on behalf of the Association, brought suit against the 
Trustees of the Association, seeking to impose personal liability on these directors, for their 
decision to fund the litigation on behalf of the Association.1 Appellants have never alleged, 
however, that the Trustees engaged in intentional misconduct,2 and it is plain that, under the law, 
1
 There is a significant question regarding the propriety of this "derivative" action. 
Under Utah law, a derivative action is inappropriate where "the injury is one to the plaintiff as a 
stockholder and to him individually, and not to the corporation." Richardson v. Arizona Fuels 
Corp.. 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). Appellants, however, claim that the Trustee's alleged 
misconduct has "caused Homeowners substantial actual damages" and "have caused 
Homeowners depreciation in the fair market value of their condominiums." App. Br. at 5. These 
claimed damages are to six individuals, not the Association. 
2
 Appellants have never claimed that the Trustees engaged in intentional 
misconduct. Nevertheless, without ever signing pleadings making such a claim, see Utah R. Civ. 
P. 11, Appellants now assert to this Court that "the Complaint's alleged facts and gross 
negligence claims do assert intentional misconduct in that the Trustees knowingly, intentionally 
and repeatedly acted ultra vires . . . ." App. Br. at 35. 
This statement is patently incorrect. In Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court held that "'willful misconduct,' in a tort context is not 
equivalent to gross negligence or reckless indifference, mental states where constructive 
knowledge suffices for liability." In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 868 (Utah 1996) (citing Golding. 
793 P.2d at 901). Thus, Appellants' claim that the Complaint's allegations of "gross negligence" 
suffice to plead intentional misconduct is legally incorrect. Moreover, as discussed in detail 
below, Appellants' assertion that the Trustees acted ultra vires not only confuses a standard of 
care with the concept of corporate authority, but it also suffers from a faulty legal premise as to 
what constitutes an ultra vires act. Accordingly, Appellants are raising, for the first time in this 
appeal, the issue of "intentional misconduct." 
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these Trustees have done nothing improper. Accordingly, each and every claim raised by 
Appellants fails as a matter of law and the district court properly dismissed the action pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Notwithstanding Appellants' convoluted arguments, this case, at its heart, is quite simple. 
The Trustees of the Association, pursuant to their charge to manage the affairs of the Association, 
and on behalf of the Association, opted to pursue litigation against CCI Mechanical for faulty work 
done on the American Towers Condominium Project. The Appellants have never claimed that the 
Board exceeded its authority in pursuing that litigation on behalf of the Association. The 
Association, acting through the Board, financed the litigation from the Association's reserve funds. 
Appellants claim that the CCI Litigation should have been funded from another Association fund, 
the Common Expense Fund. As a result of their disagreement with the Board's funding decision, 
these disgruntled homeowners filed the instant lawsuit. 
While claiming that the Trustees are individually liable to repay the funds expended on the 
CCI Litigation, Appellants have not claimed that the Trustees, or any one of them, acted in bad 
faith, fraudulently, with an intent to deceive, or with intentional misconduct. Nor have Appellants 
alleged that any Trustee derived a secret profit, engaged in self dealing, or broke the law. The sole 
basis for this lawsuit and the instant appeal is Appellants' contention that the Trustees should have 
taken money to finance the CCI Litigation from the Common Expense Fund rather than the reserve 
It is well settled that "matters not put in issue before the trial court may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal." Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see State v. 
Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 1001 (Utah 1995); Warren v. Provo Citv Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 n.4 
(Utah 1992) ("With limited exceptions, our practice has been to decline consideration of issues 
raised for the first time on appeal."). This Court is urged to disregard, therefore, Appellants' 
belated and suspect claim of intentional misconduct. 
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funds.3 Thus, it is the propriety of that action, and that action only, that is currently before the 
Court. 
Once the Court culls through the Appellants' legally unsupported arguments and critically 
examines the plethora of "issues" Appellants purport to raise, it is clear that this case involves two, 
and only two, questions of law: (1) Does the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act apply to this 
Association which is properly organized and operated as a nonprofit corporation? (2) If so, are 
these Trustees held to the standard of care set forth in that statute for officers and directors-
intentional misconduct? The answer to both of these questions is yes. Because Appellants have 
never alleged intentional misconduct on the part of the Trustees, there simply is no legal basis to 
sustain an action against the Trustees. Accordingly, the district court properly granted 
Defendants/Appellees' motion to dismiss and this Court should affirm that decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Association is Properly Organized as a Nonprofit Corporation and the Utah 
Nonprofit Corporation and Co-operative Association Act Applies 
A fundamental premise of Appellants' complaint is that, notwithstanding the organization 
of the American Towers Owners Association as a nonprofit corporation, the standard of care 
established under the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Co-operative Association Act (the 
"Nonprofit Corporation Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-54 to -112 (1996), does not apply. Instead, 
Appellants claim that the Utah Condominium Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1 to -36 (1994) (the 
"Condominium Act"), supersedes the Nonprofit Corporation Act in its entirety. However, the 
3
 The Trustees reasoned in part that they could use the Association's reserves 
because any proceeds derived from the CCI Litigation would be deposited into the reserve 
account. Although it occurred after the record in the matter, it is nevertheless undisputed that on 
February 6, 1997, the underlying litigation with CCI was settled and $425,000 was deposited into 
the Association's reserve account. 
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Condominium Act does not contain a standard of care to govern the conduct of condominium 
trustees. Appellants are therefore left with a policy argument that it makes more sense for 
condominium associations to be treated as "for-profit corporations" notwithstanding that they are 
organized as nonprofit corporations. They ask this Court to add an exception to the Nonprofit 
Corporation Act that if the nonprofit corporation has as one of its functions the management of a 
condominium, the standard of care applicable to "for-profit corporations" should apply. The 
legislature chose not to add Appellants' exception, this Court too should decline Appellants' 
invitation to legislate.4 
While Appellants make a strenuous argument that the Nonprofit Corporation Act should 
not apply, they nowhere allege that this Association is not properly organized and operated as a 
nonprofit corporation. A "nonprofit corporation" is defined as one which "does not distribute any 
part of its income to its members, trustees, or officers, and includes a nonprofit cooperative 
association." Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-19(11) (1996). Appellants have never alleged that this 
Association distributes profits to members, trustees, or officers. Accordingly, regardless of how 
other condominium owners associations may be operated, there is no basis to allege that this 
Association is not a nonprofit corporation, governed accordingly by the Nonprofit Corporation 
Act. 
4
 Appellants raise for the first time a unique claim that the "due process rights" of 
individual homeowners have been violated. As noted earlier, a claim raised for the first time on 
appeal asserting an individual cause of action in a derivative suit is improper. They also 
disregard the rather fundamental requirement that they must allege "state action" to implicate the 
due process clause. See Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). However, since Appellants find 
analogy to municipal government so appealing, perhaps they should examine the analogy to be 
drawn to the doctrine of governmental immunity as well as the means by which a dissatisfied 
citizen changes the manner in which it is governed — through election of new officials. 
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Appellants' policy argument is not only specious, it is factually wrong. First, regardless of 
whether condominium associations ought to be organized as for-profit corporations or nonprofit 
corporations is irrelevant. The fact is that this Association has been organized as a nonprofit 
corporation. Appellants have not challenged that status nor sought its dissolution.5 Moreover, the 
"overwhelming majority of corporate [property owners associations] are organized on a nonprofit 
basis." Robert G. Natelson, Law of Property Owners Associations § 3.2.2.2 at 74 (1989 & Supp. 
1996). Indeed, only one jurisdiction even expressly allows condominium owner associations to be 
incorporated as for-profit corporations, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 718.11 l(l)(a). Thus, even 
Appellants' policy argument begins to unravel. 
Appellants' textual argument that the Condominium Act supersedes the Nonprofit 
Corporation Act is even more tenuous. The argument is contrary to the text of the Condominium 
Act and inconsistent with general principles of statutory construction. The Condominium Act 
provides: 
The provisions of [the Act] shall be in addition and supplemental to all other 
provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared, provided that wherever the 
application of the provisions of this act conflict with the application of such other 
provisions, this act shall prevail. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-35(1) (emphasis added). The Condominium Act thus supplements the 
Nonprofit Corporation Act where the two do not conflict. In an attempt to disguise the fact that 
the two acts do not conflict on the issue of officer and director liability, Appellants cite other 
alleged differences between the Acts. See App. Br. at 33-34. The two Acts do not conflict, 
5
 Appellants rely extensively throughout their brief on Turner v. Hi-Country 
Homeowner's Ass'n.. 910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996). Appellants fail to note, however, that the 
association in that case, like the Association here and the "overwhelming majority" of 
condominium associations around the nation, was organized as a nonprofit corporation. Id at 
1224. 
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however, on the central issue of this case because only the Nonprofit Corporation Act establishes a 
standard of care for officers and directors. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107(1). Appellants' 
argument that the Condominium Act displaces the Nonprofit Corporation Act is impaled on the 
point that they must look to a third act, the for-profit corporation code to supply the standard of 
care which they claim the Condominium Act somehow displaces from the Nonprofit Corporation 
Act. 
It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction that a court will interpret statutes to make 
the statute harmonious with other statutes relevant to the subject matter. Business Aviation v. 
Medivest Inc.. 882 P.2d 662, 666 (Utah 1994); Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 480, 481 
(Utah 1980); see also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (courts 
strive to avoid "absurd meaning" in statutory interpretation). It also is fundamental that 
"[p]rovisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be 
applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose." Murray City 
v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). 
Not surprisingly, there are differences between the Condominium Act and the Nonprofit 
Corporation Act. One statute regulates all condominium associations, whether incorporated or not 
-- the other statute regulates all nonprofit corporations, regardless of their underlying purpose. 
Differences between two statutes, however, do not translate into irreconcilable conflict. The 
failed savings and loan cases are instructive in this regard. In FDIC v. Isham. 777 F. Supp. 828 (D. 
Colo. 1991) cited by Appellants, the U.S. District Court held that section 1821 of FIRREA, which 
provided a "gross negligence" standard for directors of federally insured savings and loans, did not 
serve to limit director liability in those states that imposed a higher standard of care, i.e., 
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negligence. Id at 832. Similarly, in FDIC v. Canfield. 957 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.V aff d. 967 F.2d 
443 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc), the Tenth Circuit held that "[n]o reasonable construction of 'may' 
[in FIRREA] suggests that it limits the liability of officers or directors to gross negligence. In 
other words, in states where an officer or director may be held liable for simple negligence, the 
FDIC may rely on state law to enable its action." Canfield, 957 F.2d at 788. Thus, as these cases 
demonstrate, the permissive language in one statute is not "contrary" to the mandatory language of 
another statute. 
In this case, the Appellants make much about the mandatory nature of the Condominium Act 
versus the permissible provisions of the Nonprofit Corporation Act. See App. Br. at 33-34. There 
is, however, no conflict in relevant provisions. Nothing in the Condominium Act is inconsistent 
with the Nonprofit Corporation Act. There are mandatory provisions in the Condominium Act 
which are permissive in the Nonprofit Corporation Act. This simply means that, just as with the 
savings and loan cases, where one statute provides a standard, that standard will be imposed. And, 
where one Act is silent, the provisions of the other Act will control. See Murray City. 663 P.2d at 
1318. For example, under the Condominium Act, bylaws are mandatory, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-8-10; under the Nonprofit Corporation Act, bylaws are discretionary, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-6-44. Thus, a condominium association organized as a nonprofit corporation in Utah must 
have bylaws. 
The American Towers Owners Association was incorporated as a nonprofit corporation and 
thus is governed by the Nonprofit Corporation Act. See Decl. Art. XX § 20.02, Complaint Ex. A 
[R. at 85] (emphasis added) ("This Declaration shall be governed by and construed in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah . . . . The provisions hereof shall be in addition and 
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supplemental to the provisions of the Condominium Act and all other provisions of applicable 
law."). The Association's Bylaws refer specifically to the Nonprofit Corporation Act: 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and 
Cooperative Association Act, the Board of Trustees of American Towers 
Owners Association, a Utah nonprofit corporation, hereby adopts the 
following Bylaws for such nonprofit corporation. 
Bylaws, Complaint Ex. B, at 45 (emphasis added). [R at 111.] 
By its express terms the Nonprofit Corporation Act, including the standard of care, applies 
to: "(a) all corporations organized under this chapter." There is no exception for owners 
associations. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-20(l)(a). 
The treatise cited extensively by Appellants, Liability of Corporate Officers & Directors, 
similarly notes that: 
Some condominium associations are subject to both state condominium 
statute and state nonprofit corporation laws. While there are similarities 
among state condominium acts, there are also substantial differences. 
Accordingly, generalized observations as to questions of tort liability are 
not possible. 
1 W.E. Knepper & D.A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers & Directors § 12-3(c) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). Such "generalized observations as to questions of tort liability" are 
exactly what Appellants attempt to present. In doing so, however, Appellants ignore established 
Utah law on the liability of officers and directors of nonprofit organizations and its standard of 
intentional misconduct. These two statutes may be read harmoniously and Appellants' argument 
that the Condominium Act entirely supersedes the Nonprofit Corporation Act is not well taken.6 
6
 The transcript of the district court argument, to the extent it is accurate, indicates 
that Judge Young stated that the Utah Revised Model Business Corporation Act is implicated 
here and that the Nonprofit Corporation Act "goes, if at all, to torts." [R. 496.] Although the 
transcript omits it, Judge Young appears to be merely restating the Appellants' argument which 
he clearly rejects in holding that the only applicable standard of care is intentional misconduct. 
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II. Individual Trustees of the Association May Be Held Liable For Contracts of the 
Association Only if the Trustee Engages in Intentional Misconduct 
Appellants have advanced a most unusual argument for holding the individual Trustees 
liable. Appellants first state that the Declaration and Bylaws, together with the provisions of the 
Condominium Act form a "contract" between individual owners and the Association. App. Br. at 
17. This unremarkable proposition is indeed the law in Utah. See Turner v. Hi-Country 
Homeowner's Ass'n.. 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996). Appellants go on to assert, however, 
that the Trustees can be sued individually for actions taken by them in their capacity as board 
members because, in their role as owners, each of these individuals is "bound strictly to comply 
with the Declarations and Bylaws." App. Br. at 18. This argument finds no support in statutory or 
case law. First, the argument suffers from a fatal technical flaw because there is simply no 
contract between the owners and individual Trustees. Under fundamental principles of agency, as 
agents of the corporation, directors are not liable for a "contract" of the corporation unless they 
breach the standard of care they owe the corporation. Second, Appellants' "strict compliance" 
argument is contrary to the text of the statute, the Declaration, and the Bylaws. 
A. The Owners, Acting Derivatively, Lack Standing to Sue the Trustees 
The Appellants claim that the Trustee breached the Association's Declarations by spending 
reserves without authorization. However, the obligation which the owners claim was breached is 
an obligation of the "Association." The "Association shall establish an adequate reserve to cover 
[R. 497.] If the district court was stating its own reasoning rather than restating Appellants' 
argument, this misstatement of the law is harmless in this context and the Court can affirm the 
order of the district court although one of his stated reasons is incorrect. See Berube v. Fashion 
Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Utah 1989) ("[W]e will affirm the trial court on any proper 
ground, even if the court below assigned an incorrect reason for its ruling."); see also Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). 
morgan\plead\amtowbn 627 16 
the cost of reasonably predictable repairs and replacements." Section 19.05. This is not an 
undertaking by the Trustees or by the owners and there is no other provision in the Declaration that 
dictates how reserves are to be spent or even mentions reserves or reserve funds. 
The Appellants, acting derivatively, have not stated a cause of action against the Trustees 
based on contract. Citing Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowner's Ass'n.. 910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996), 
Appellants correctly note that the Utah Supreme Court held that corporate bylaws, together with 
the articles of incorporation, the statute under which it was incorporated,7 and the member's 
application constitute a contract "between the member and the corporation." IcL at 1225. 
However, Appellants have not cited a single case for the bizarre proposition that individual 
Trustees are bound by the "contract between the association and owners," a contract to which these 
individual Trustees are not a party. As Appellants' cases demonstrate, the parties to the "contract" 
are the association on one side and the individual owners on the other. Thus, an association could 
sue an individual owner for breach of contract (see Turner. 910 P.2d at 1225), or an owner might 
sue the association for a breach (see Wolinski v. Kadison. 449 N.E.2d 151, 156-57 (111. Ct. App. 
1983)), but there is no provision in the law for an association to sue its agent, i.e., its director, for a 
breach of a contract to which the director did not agree. 
The agreement to establish a reserve account is between the Association and the owners. 
The Association undertakes to raise money to establish adequate reserves. The owners promise to 
pay assessments to fund the Association's obligations. If the Appellants' argument were to 
prevail, an Association that failed to assess its members for an adequate reserve could merely sue 
7
 Appellants do not concern themselves with the fact that part of the contract they 
claim is breached is the Nonprofit Corporation Act which insulates directors from liability for all 
of their actions except "intentional misconduct." 
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the directors on the contract and make claim to their personal assets to fulfill the obligation of the 
Association. There is no support for such an absurd result. The Trustees are liable to pay an 
obligation of the Association only if their failure to assess the owners or their use of the reserves 
was a violation of the applicable standard of care -- intentional misconduct. 
It is fundamental that "a corporation only acts through agents. The directors are the 
managing agents " Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh. 149 U.S. 368, 382 (1893). The 
Trustees of the Association are agents of the Association. In Carlie v. Morgan. 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1996), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the notion that an agent could be held liable on the 
contractual obligation of his or her principal. KL at 6. Again, this is an unremarkable proposition 
adopted in literally every jurisdiction and set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency: "[A] 
person making or purporting to make a contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal 
does not become party to the contract.. . . One bringing an action on the contract has the burden 
of showing that the other is a party to it." Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 343 (1957); see 3 
Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 302 (1986) ("If a contract is made with a known agent acting within the 
scope of his authority for a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal alone and the 
agent cannot be held liable thereon."). See also Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp.. 12 F.3d 1170, 
1177 (2d Cir. 1993) ("A director is not personally liable for his corporation's contractual breaches 
unless he assumed personal liability, acted in bad faith or committed a tort in connection with the 
performance of the contract."). 
In this case, as in the agreement, to establish a reserve account does not require that the 
Trustees personally fund it. By its terms it is between the Association and the individual owners. 
If the Association breached this contract in funding the CCI Litigation from the Association's 
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reserves, then the individual owners may have a cause of action against the Association. The 
Association would be required to assess its members to establish or augment the reserves. Any 
claim that the Association has against its agent Trustees, however, would derive exclusively from 
the Trustees' breach of the applicable standard of care, in this case, intentional misconduct. The 
Association simply has no direct cause of action against the Trustees based on the "contract." 
Stated another way, the Trustees were not party to the contract between the Association and the 
owners and may not, therefore, be sued directly upon that contract.8 Appellants' claims based on 
breach of contract were properly dismissed. 
B. Neither the Text of the Declaration and Bylaws Nor the Law Dictate that the 
Trustees "Strictly Comply" With the "Contract" 
Aside from the legal incongruity presented by Appellants' argument, it is inconsistent with 
the text of the Declaration and Bylaws as well as the law of this state. Section 18.01 of the 
Declaration, on its face, applies solely to owners, not Trustees: 
18.01. Compliance. Each Owner shall comply strictly with the provisions of this 
Declaration, the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association, rules and 
regulations promulgated by the Association as herein provided, and the decisions and 
resolutions of the Association adopted pursuant thereto, as the same may lawfully be 
modified and amended from time to time. [R. at 83.] 
Recognizing the futility in arguing that this section imposes a duty of strict compliance upon 
individual Trustees, Appellants next quote § 9.01 of the Bylaws, claiming that this section creates 
8
 Appellants feign incredulity at the proposition that a contract claim may involve a 
tort standard of care. See App. Br. at 20 ("No case authority exists, and the Trustees cited none 
below, that would permit, much less require, dismissal of the breach of contract claims for failure 
to meet a tort standard of conduct."). Appellants' argument, however, evinces their basic 
misunderstanding as to whom the parties to the "contract" were. A more preposterous 
proposition would be holding a party liable on a contract to which he or she was not a party. 
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a "reciprocal duty" of strict compliance for the Trustees. App. Br. at 18. Section 9.01 does no 
such thing. It relates solely to rules and regulations: 
9.01. Rules and Regulations. The Board of Trustees may from time to 
time adopt, amend, repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations 
governing the use and operation of the Project; provided, however, that 
such rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the rights and 
duties set forth in the Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or these 
Bylaws. 
[R. at 121.] 
Section 9.01 goes on to provide that rules and regulations relating to the use of the residential 
and commercial areas must be approved by a majority of the Trustees representing those respective 
groups and further providing that the members must be provided copies of all rules and regulations 
adopted by the Board. LI Even a cursory reading of this provision reveals that it does not serve to 
create some type of "reciprocal duty" upon individual Trustees. It relates to rulemaking authority 
and nothing more. This litigation does not involve rulemaking. Thus, Section 9.01 is wholly 
inapplicable. 
Neither the text of the Declaration and Bylaws nor the text of Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-89 
require Trustees to "strictly comply" with the Declaration and Bylaws because such a notion is 
contrary to the purpose of the strict compliance requirement. The very cases cited by Appellants 
demonstrate this point. See, e.g.. Turner. 910 P.2d at 1225; Appeal of Two Crow Ranch. Inc.. 494 
9
 This section provides: 
Each unit owner shall comply strictly with the covenants, conditions and 
restrictions as set forth in the declaration or in the deed to his unit, and with the bylaws 
and/or house rules and with the administrative rules and regulations drafted pursuant 
thereto . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-8 (1996). It is obvious that this section serves to regulate the conduct of 
owners qua owners, not owners qua trustees. 
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P.2d 915, 919 (Mont. 1972); Jorgensen Realty. Inc. v. Box. 701 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1985). 
C. The Trustees Have "Strictly Complied" With the "Contract" 
Although owners are bound to "strictly comply" with the contract formed by the Declaration, 
Bylaws, relevant statute, and the owners' individual applications, neither the text of these 
provisions nor the law supports a contention that individual Trustees thereby become "strictly" and 
personally liable for the obligations of the Association. Even if this Court were to accept 
Appellants' argument and conclude that the individual Trustees of a nonprofit corporation are 
bound to "strictly comply" with a provision of the contract not directed to them, this Court should 
still affirm the district court's dismissal because the Trustees have strictly complied. In this case, 
strict compliance with the Declaration and Bylaws, for Trustees who are given "all of the powers 
of the Association, whether derived from law or the Articles of Incorporation," [Bylaws, f 4.01, R. 
at 114.], means simply that the Trustees will not do anything which they are affirmatively 
prohibited from doing, either by law, the Declaration, or the Bylaws.10 
The only provision in the Declaration or Bylaws which addresses the Association's reserve 
account is Section 19.05 of the Declaration which provides: 
The Association shall establish an adequate reserve to cover the cost of 
reasonably predictable and necessary repairs and replacements of the 
Common Areas and any component thereof and shall cause such reserve to 
be funded by regular monthly or other periodic assessments against the 
Condominiums rather than by Special Assessments. 
10
 Appellants' analogy to municipal government also breaks down here. Appellants 
argue that, like a city, the Board's power is strictly limited to express powers and those implied 
powers reasonably necessary to carry out express powers. App. Br. at 37 n.l 1 (citing Layton City 
v. Speth. 578 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978)). The text of the Bylaws is to the contrary, granting the 
Board all powers under law except those specifically reserved to the owners. [Bylaws, f^ 4.01]. 
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[R. at 84.] This provision is unambiguous and the Court can interpret its meaning from the words 
used. Turner, 910 P.2d at 1226. The provision plainly does not prohibit the Association from 
electing to sue a contractor for faulty work as a means of effecting "repair" of the Project. Thus, 
this is an area in which the Trustees may exercise the broad discretion granted them under the 
Declaration and Bylaws. See Decl. at 110.03 ("The Association may obtain and pay for the 
services of such personnel as the Association shall determine to be necessary or desirable for the 
proper operation of the Project. . . . The Association may obtain and pay for legal and accounting 
services necessary or desirable in connection with the operation of the Project or the enforcement 
of this Declaration.") [R. at 67.]; Bylaws, f 4.01 (granting Board power to manage affairs of 
Association) [R. at 114.]. Exercise of discretion granted them cannot, as a matter of law, be 
considered a failure on the part of the Board to "strictly comply" with the Declaration and Bylaws. 
D. Appellants' Fiduciary Duty Claim 
Appellants claim that the Trustees have a fiduciary obligation to the owners. Appellees do 
not disagree. The fiduciary duty owed by officers and directors of any nonprofit corporation is 
defined as the duties of loyalty and care. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess. 820 F. Supp. 1359, 
1366 (D. Utah 1993). Appellants do not claim that the Trustees breached their duty of loyalty. 
App. Br. at 29 n.5 ("The Complaint does not allege a breach of the duty of loyalty."). Thus, the 
only claim by the Appellants is that the Trustees breached their duty of care. 
In Hess, the directors of a failed savings and loan were being sued for negligence and breach 
of fiduciary duty. While Hess involved the standard of care for directors of a for-profit 
corporation, the court's holding is applicable here: 
In Utah, the fiduciary duty of care is simply the level of care state law 
requires a director to exercise in managing corporate affairs. That is the 
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identical standard of ordinary negligence which underlies a claim for negligent mismanagement. 
Accordingly, it is this court's judgment that under Utah law, a claim for breach of a director's 
fiduciary duty of care is tantamount to a claim of negligent mismanagement. See Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (treating a claim for breach of fiduciary duty of care 
under Delaware law the same as a negligence claim). 
Id. at 1366 (emphasis added). This Court recently employed the reasoning of Hess in C&Y Corp. 
v. General Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995). There, as here, directors allegedly 
breached their fiduciary duties. This Court concluded: 
[Gen Bio] argues Condie and Yarter breached their obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing. Our fiduciary duty analysis effectively disposes of 
this issue. Cf Resolution Trust Corp.. 820 F. Supp. at 1366 (refusing to 
address breach of fiduciary duty claim as duplicative of negligence claim). 
14 at 56. 
Under C&Y and Hess, the breadth of the fiduciary duty of care owed by a corporate director 
is gauged by the standard of care set forth in the applicable statute. For nonprofit directors the 
"level of care state law requires a director to exercise in managing corporate affairs" is intentional 
misconduct. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107. All other allegations which embody a higher standard 
of care must be dismissed.11 
III. The Trustees Have Not Committed Any Ultra Vires Act 
Appellants take the same shotgun approach to ultra vires analysis that they do to the 
fiduciary duty analysis. However, Appellants confuse the "authority" of the Association to take 
11
 The cases cited by Appellants do not support their fiduciary duty claim. For 
example, in Wolinski v. Kadison. 449 N.E. 2d 151 (111. Ct. App. 1983), the governing board 
flagrantly violated a voting requirement "made explicitly in the bylaws." LI at 156. 
Significantly, the plaintiff in Wolinksi alleged "wilful and wanton" misconduct on the part of 
individual board members, an allegation which the court concluded stated a separate cause of 
action. Id. at 157. No such allegation was made here. 
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certain actions with the means by which the Trustees elect to execute such authorized action.12 An 
action is ultra vires only if it exceeds the express or implied authority of the corporation as fixed 
by its charter, statute, or the common law. 7A William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the 
Law of Private Corporations §3399 (perm. ed. 1989). An action that is authorized, but which did 
not result from the observance of proper corporate formalities is not ultra vires. Id §§ 3401-
3402; see Independence One Mortg. Corp. v. Gillespie. 672 A.2d 1279, 1281 (NJ. Super. 1996) 
{ultra vires where official "utterly without capacity" to perform an act; intra vires where act is 
authorized, although imperfectly executed); 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2012 (1985) (an 
"intra vires" act is one that is taken without proper authorization of the directors or shareholders). 
Statutory provisions dealing with ultra vires transactions have no bearing on intra vires acts. Id. 
Appellants attempt to cast their challenge to the Association's prosecution of the CCI 
Litigation as an "ultra vires" act on the part of the Trustees.13 This challenge is baseless, however, 
12
 Appellants continue misleadingly to cite case law. In S&T Anchorage v. Lewis, 
575 So.2d 696 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991), the court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs' breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. Id at 698. That case does not stand for the proposition that "[c]ourts 
consider an ultra vires act to be a breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of contract, to which the 
intentional misconduct standard for torts clearly would not apply." App. Br. at 25. 
13
 Were this Court to accept Appellants' argument, nonprofit directors would be 
placed in a "damned if you do; damned if you don't" posture. It has been held that failing to sue 
may be an ultra vires giving away of corporate assets. See Helvering v. Davis. 301 U.S. 619 
(1937). Thus, under Appellants' argument, nonprofit directors such as the Trustees here may face 
personal liability based on ultra vires conduct if they elect to pursue litigation and they may 
similarly face personal liability if they elect not to pursue litigation. Utah law, however, protects 
directors from such a Hobson's Choice: 
A trustee or officer of a nonprofit corporation is not personally liable to the 
corporation or its members for civil claims arising from acts or omissions made in 
the performance of his duties as a trustee or officer, unless the acts or omissions 
are the result of his intentional misconduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107(1). 
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because the Association, acting through the Trustees, is authorized to sue and be sued: "A 
corporation is in law, for civil purposes, deemed a person. It may be sue and be sued, grant and 
receive, and do all other acts not ultra vires which a natural person could do." Railroad Co. v. 
Harris. 79 U.S. 65, 81 (1870); see Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-22; id § 16-10a-302(l) (business 
corporations). 
Appellants' argument is difficult to fathom. There can be no question that the prosecution of 
the CCI Litigation was authorized. In Utah, a nonprofit corporation may "sue and be sued, 
complain and defend, in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-22(2). Furthermore, under 
the Condominium Act, the management committee (in this case, the Association, acting through 
the Board of Trustees, see Decl. f 10.07 [R. at 67] is empowered to bring suit on behalf of the 
Association. Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-33. And the Supreme Court has read this provision broadly, 
holding that such a management committee is "cloaked with the statutory right to sue."14 
Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n. Man. Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co.. 668 P.2d 535, 542 (Utah 
1983). Finally, the Association Bylaws expressly grant to the Board of Trustees the authority to 
"exercise all of the powers of the Association" derived from law or Articles, except such powers 
as are vested solely in the members. Bylaws % 4.01. [R. at 114.] As such, Appellants' argument 
that the Trustees' decision to pursue and finance the litigation against CCI was ultra vires is 
simply wrong. 
In their opening brief, Appellants drum out a parade of horribles which are supposed to 
demonstrate the '"ultra vires' conduct" engaged in by the Trustees. App. Br. at 27. A careful 
analysis of this very list, however, demonstrates the impropriety of Appellants' argument. For 
14
 Given this express power, it follows that the Trustees necessarily have the implied 
necessary power to finance litigation. Decl. f 10.08. [R. at 68.] 
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example, Appellants claim that the Trustees committed an ultra vires act by "[vjoting in a secret 
meeting to fund OQI from the Reserve Fund/' Id Even assuming the truth of this allegation-
which the Trustees would dispute-there is nothing in the Declaration, Bylaws, Nonprofit 
Corporation Act, or the Condominium Act which even defines, much less expressly prohibits the 
Trustees from conducting "secret meetings," whatever that term means. If Appellants are claiming 
that the meetings were not properly noticed, see Bylaws, f 4.06 [R. at 115] Utah Code Ann. § 16-
6-39, that is a waivable defect and plainly does not constitute an ultra vires act. If the Appellants 
are complaining because the owners were not given notice of the Board meeting, it goes without 
saying that that contention is without merit. Notice of Directors' meeting generally is not given to 
shareholders. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-39; see also Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-322(l). Thus, 
under Appellants' rationale, all meetings of all boards of directors would be considered "secret." 
Given that the pursuit of the CCI Litigation was not ultra vires, the means by which the 
Trustees financed the litigation falls squarely within the business judgment rule. Stated simply, the 
Trustees reasonably believed, allegedly on the advice of tte Associations' lawyer and accountant, 
that the CCI Litigation could be financed with monies from the Association's reserves. Nothing in 
the Declaration prohibits such use. Accordingly, whether this Court—or any court—were to 
determine that the reserves were not the proper source of funds for the CCI Litigation does not 
make the Trustees good-faith decision to use those funds an ultra vires act. It was, at the very 
most, an erroneous judgment. The law simply does not impose liability on nonprofit corporate 
directors for errors in judgment. See Dockside Ass'n. Inc. v. Detyens. 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1987) ("A court should be reluctant to question action taken intra vires by the governing 
board of a nonprofit corporation."); see also Gleason v. International Multifoods Corp.. 577 P.2d 
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931, 934 (Ore. 1978) ("If there are plausible business reasons supportive of the decision of the 
board of directors, and such reasons can be given credence, a Court will not interfere with a 
corporate board's right to make that decision. It is not our function to referee every corporate 
squabble or disagreement. It is our duty to redress wrongs, not to settle competitive business 
interests. Absent any bad faith, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or abuse of discretion, no wrong 
cognizable or correctable in the Courts has occurred."); Gay v. Gay's Supermarkets. Inc.. 343 A.2d 
577, 580 (Me. 1975); cf Jov v. North. 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) cert denied. 460 U.S. 
1051 (1983); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell. 903 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D. Ariz. 1994) 
(articulating "complete abdication" standard of care in for-profit ultra vires analysis). 
Appellants' argument is not that the Trustees did not have the authority to pursue the 
CCI Litigation on behalf of the Association, but that they disagree with the source of funds the 
Trustees used to finance the CCI Litigation. Appellants' remedy for their dissatisfaction with the 
Board's decision, however, is not to bring a derivative action and to seek judicial intervention in 
this "corporate squabble," see Gleason. 577 P.2d at 934. Their remedy is to rally their neighbors 
and remove Board members according to the procedure set forth in the Bylaws. See Bylaws K 4.09 
[R. at 116]. Having tried and having failed in that effort, see Amen. Verif. Complaint, f 99 [R. at 
213], they have elected to pursue litigation. 
In this case, Appellants challenge the Board's decision regarding financing of the CCI 
Litigation. The Trustees were faced with a decision as to how to remedy defects in the Project. As 
Judge Young observed, the Board could have hired a second plumbing contractor to redo the work 
or it could have chosen to sue the first contractor. The Board chose the latter. According to 
Appellants' rationale, the Board could have paid a new plumbing contractor from the 
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Association's reserves, but they are subject to personal liability for seeking redress from CCI 
Mechanical. The Board's decision was, pure and simple, a business decision. Absent some 
explicit provision to the contrary, director liability should not turn on whether the remedy a board 
seeks involves paper versus pipe. The rule protecting valid and informed business decisions ~ 
regardless of whether all shareholders agree - is designed to protect Trustees from the "most 
imperfect device" of "after-the-fact litigation." Joy. 692 F.2d at 886; see also Ungeleider v. One 
Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp.. 623 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Ap. Ct. N.Y. 1995), Papalexiou v. Tower West 
Condominium. 401 A.2d 280, 285-87 (N.J. Super. 1979) (business judgment rule requires 
"presence of fraud or lack of good faith in the conduct of corporation's internal affairs before the 
decisions of a board of directors can be questioned"). 
Assuming that financing the litigation from the Association's reserves could be considered 
an unauthorized act, the Trustees still are not liable because they are not alleged to have committed 
an act they knew to be wrong. In Simon v. Socony-Oil Vacuum Co.. 38 N.Y. S.2d 270 (N.Y. 
1942), the court held that, in order for a director to be held liable for an ultra vires act, the director 
must have committed the act "knowingly." Id. at 274. Because the directors in that case "did not 
knowingly exceed their authority or the authority of the corporation," the court held that they could 
not be held personally liable for damages. Id.15 
15
 Appellants, claim that the intentional misconduct standard does not apply in ultra 
vires analysis. That statement is plainly incorrect. A director must know the extent of his or her 
authority and wilfully intend to violate it before personal liability attaches. See Simon. 38 N.Y. 
S. 2d at 274-75; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-19-2 (shielding volunteer directors from liability 
absent wilful, knowing violation). 
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In this case, the Declaration and Bylaws did not unambiguously prohibit the Trustees from 
financing the litigation to repair building defects from the Association's reserves.16 They are 
alleged to have acted on professional advice. Thus, there was no way for the Trustees to know that 
such conduct might later be judged to be ultra vires. Where directors "act honestly, and for what 
they regard as the best interests of the corporation and do not wilfully prevent or exceed their 
powers but only misjudge the same, on the plainest principles of justice, as well as under the 
adjudicated cases, they could not be held liable." 2 Thompson on Corporation, § 1404 (perm. ed.). 
Appellants have not alleged willful violation of the Declaration and Bylaws. Indeed they allege 
the contrary, that the directors acted upon the advice of the Association's lawyers and accountants. 
Amen. Verif. Complaint ^ 92 [R. at 212]. Accordingly, their claim of ultra vires acts must fail. 
IV. Appellants9 Claim of Corporate Mismanagement Falls With its Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Claim 
Continuing to pound the table, Appellants assert that "[t]he Complaint alleges a legally 
sufficient claim for Corporate Mismanagement and Waste and Assets (Count VIII) through the 
Trustees' failure to exercise due care to see that the Capital Reserve Fund was used for the 
Association's benefit and not wasted." App. Br. at 29. This is simply a rehashing of the same 
mistaken argument that Appellants advance throughout their brief; that is, notwithstanding the 
Association's organization as a nonprofit corporation, the court should impose a simple negligence 
16
 For the financing of the CCI Litigation from the Association's reserves to 
constitute an ultra vires act, the Declaration and Bylaws must affirmatively and unambiguously 
prohibit such action. In the cases cited by Appellants, directors breached just such unambiguous 
provisions. See Johnson v. Fairfax Village Condominium IV Unit Owners Ass'n.. 548 A.2d 87, 
90 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988); Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n.. 351 So.2d 755, 757-
58 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); S&T Anchorage. Inc. v. Lewis. 575 So.2d 696, 698 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1991). 
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standard of care upon the Trustees rather than the intentional misconduct standard set forth in the 
statute. 
As discussed above, Appellants' argument is contrary to law.17 The Trustees do have a 
fiduciary duty of care to the Association and that "duty of care is simply the level of care state law 
requires a director to exercise in managing corporate affairs." Hess. 820 F. Supp. at 1366. 
Because Appellants have not pled intentional misconduct on the part of the Trustees, their 
corporate mismanagement claim falls right along side their breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
V. Appellants Are Not Entitled to Attorneys Fees or an Incentive Fee 
Appellants assert an entitlement to attorneys fees and an incentive fee. Attorneys fees and 
expenses may be awarded when a derivative action confers substantial benefit on the corporation. 
Rosenbaum v. McAllister. 64 F.3d 1439, 1441 (10th Cir. 1995). The obvious corollary to the 
common-fund doctrine, however, is that the litigation must in fact confer a benefit on the 
corporation. Appellants' Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The 
action plainly has not conferred any benefit on the Association. 
17
 Appellants' own cases repudiate the very proposition advanced. For example, in 
Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n.. a homeowner attempted, as Appellants do, to hold 
directors personally liable for an alleged breach of the association's bylaws. The California 
Supreme Court dismissed the action, noting: 
The board members may not be held personally liable absent allegations that they 
entered into a contract with plaintiff on their own behalf or purported to bind 
themselves personally. 
723 P.2d 573, 586 n.20 (Cal. 1986); see also Board of Managers v. Fairway at N. Hills. 603 
N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (App. 1993) (dismissing a breach of contract claim against a condominium 
association trustee "as the claim[] improperly sought to impose personal liability upon him for 
alleged misdeeds committed by him in his capacity as a corporate officer."). 
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VI. The District Court's "Speculation" is Irrelevant 
Appellants go on for eleven pages about the impropriety of the district court's "speculation" 
regarding certain matters. This argument is unnecessary and misleading. This court has the 
transcript of the hearing before it. Although the transcript appears to be garbled in a number of 
instances the Court can evaluate for itself whether Judge Young was "speculating" or whether he 
was attempting to clarify the unusual argument being advanced by the Appellants through the 
traditional method of what-if hypotheticals. In any event, the failure of Appellants' claims does 
not rest on the district court's hypotheticals; the Complaint fails as a matter of law because the 
Appellants have not alleged that the Trustees engaged in intentional misconduct. Judge Young 
clearly so held and any other comments by this Court are irrelevant to the correct decision Judge 
Young reached. See Berube supra. This inescapable legal failing stands completely apart from 
any "speculation" on the part of the district court. 
VII. Appellants Have Waived Their Right to Amend the Complahit 
In the final sentence of their opening brief, Appellants seek the alternative ruling of he Court 
for "leave to amend further to allege intentional misconduct. App. Br. at 50. At the conclusion of 
the hearing in this matter, the Court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, stating - - "the 
directors are only to be held liable for intentional misconduct, and thus that must be pled in that 
way in order for them to be liable." [R. at 497.] Counsel for appellants sought clarification of the 
Court's ruling: 
Mr. Gesas: Just so the record is clear, is that with prejudice, or with leave to amend if we 
have to proceed. 
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The Court: I will provide the opportunity to plead with leave to amend. [R. at 497-98.]18 
Appellants had a choice: Either amend the Complaint or treat the dismissal as final and 
appeal. Appellants chose the latter. 
Appellants filed the instant appeal of a final order pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Having elected to treat the district court's dismissal as final and pursue this 
appeal, Appellants have waived their right to further amend. See Williams v. State. 716 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1986). 
Appellants, like the plaintiff in Williams, seek to have their cake and eat it too. They filed 
this appeal of an order they elected to treat as final. Yet, they want to treat the order as non-final, 
and be allowed to amend their Complaint if they lose in this forum. The law does not allow such 
tactics. Appellants waived their right to amend the Complaint when they filed the instant appeal. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court and the case should not be remanded with 
leave to amend. 
18
 The Order Granting Motion to Dismiss provides: ". . . the Court finds that the 
only applicable standard of care for directors or trustees of Utah nonprofit condominium 
associations is intentional misconduct. Consequently the court dismisses the entire Amended 
Complaint, including the contract claims with prejudice, and grants the Appellants' leave to 
amend to assert only claims for intentional misconduct." [R. 376.] 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court dismissing Appellants' Complaint 
should be AFFIRMED. 
DATED this ^ T j f d a y of June, 1997. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
By: 
Brent V. Manning 
JackM. MorgaiOr. 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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